



At-Risk Safety Metric

A Proactive Safety Measurement Strategy

presented by

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Measuring the Level of Safety in Aviation Operations

There is an industry-wide struggle to accurately:

- > Determine the level of safety of operations
- > Identify the true causes of unsafe conditions
- > Measure and trend operational safety



The Problem With Measuring Safety

Traditionally, safety is measured reactively...

- ✓ after an accident, incident, or injury occurs
- ✓ investigations stop after identifying "who" made the error
- ✓ interventions focus on proximate conditions not the real "root cause" of the event
- prevention strategies generally do not change unsafe behaviors



How Safe Is Your Operation?


When asked what the level of safety is at their operation, most managers can only report...

"We haven't had an (accident, aircraft damage, injury) for (1,2,6...weeks, months)"

Such "bad outcomes" are rare enough that they provide little insight into how to effectively prevent errors!



Maintenance Human Error Iceberg





What's the difference between...

Circumstances

Accidents

Incidents

?

Personal Injuries

Reportable Events

Unreported Errors




Results of Reactive Approach

Safety measurements based only on accidents & incidents

- ➤ Allow analysis only after a "bad outcome" has resulted
- > Does not provide enough data to accurately trend error potentials
- ➤ Provides little insight into "root causes" of unsafe acts
- Does not accurately identify condition

Like the "Gopher Game" at an arcade, prevention strategies based on such measurements are always trying to catchup with errors





To Move Toward a

Proactive Safety Strategy

We need:

- ✓ A comprehensive safety information database
- ✓ To identify the "root causes" of errors
- ✓ Change worker behaviors
- ✓ Address organizational conditions which promote errors
- ✓ Develop a method for real-time monitoring and continual improvement of operational safety





Need More Information...

Need a more robust database of errors/causes...

- ✓ Accidents / incidents historic data
- ✓ Aircraft & ground equipment damage
- ✓ Personal injury
- ✓ "Near-miss" and safety concern reports
- Real-time assessment of "at-risk" worker behaviors and operational safety levels



... which leads to effective solutions

To be effective, safety measurements should:

- > Accumulated records in a common database
- ➤ Provide a common classification scheme of "root causes"
- ➤ Periodically report "top" safety problems to promote targeted interventions
- Trend safety levels to show improvements and areas of opportunity




Maintenance Human Error Iceberg

We need to look more closely at *Unreported Incidents*

... That is, the day to day activities and conditions which lead to bad outcomes...

... If we can change unsafe conditions and behaviors and reduce unreported errors, then accidents and incidents will also be reduced...





Assessing Safety in Real-Time!

Aviation work environments are in a constant state of change... to truly *prevent* future errors, we must...

- accurately assess current levels of safety
- identify emerging error potentials
- adjust error management strategies to meet changing needs

We must be able to measure safety in "real-time"!



The Missing Tool for a Proactive Approach to Safety

The key to unlocking a truly proactive approach to managing errors lies in being able to monitor:

✓ Workers' at-risk behaviors

✓ the operation's level of unsafe acts & errors

...day-to-day in the workplace.



Purdue's Safety Metrics System

Goal – Design a Safety Metric which will:

- ✓ Measure the level of unsafe acts (real-time)
- ✓ Identify the most common sources of errors
- ✓ Target "top three" at-risk behaviors for each career group for intervention strategies
- ✓ Monitor and report changes in error potentials
- ✓ Trend safety level over time to show progress



At-Risk Behavior Safety Audit

Safety in "real-time"

- A Beginning -

Previous Research - Actions of workers which most often lead to errors, incidents, accidents...

- > Not following procedures
- > Knowingly taking risks
- > Loss of situational awareness
- > Not adhering to accepted safety practices



To Be Measurable; at-risk behaviors must be

Observable – through

- physical actions
- records / reports
- work related outcomes

Clearly Identifiable
Unambiguous

(Can not measure things like)

- intentions
- thoughts



Defining the "at-risk" behaviors to be measured...

Working with the industry partner team...

Identify common errors which lead to unsafe acts

- ✓ Review historic data to identify common errors
- ✓ Define work process and safe practices
- ✓ Evaluate policies & procedures

Determine which at-risk behaviors can be observed


Fully define observable indicators of at-risk behaviors

Develop observational checklist






Sample Safety Observation Checklists





Sample Safety Observation Checklists



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No FOA check pr	ior to Eq. moved into position					Ī								
FOA damage not	reported appropriately													
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Monitoring Unsafe Behaviors


Workplace safety observations



- Observed at least 2 complete operations per career field per shift
- Recorded the number of occurrences of each at-risk behavior
- Monitored and recorded unsafe conditions in the workplace
- Performed worker interviews to determine "root causes" of behavior
- Provided immediate feedback and safety mentoring to workers




Safety Metrics Program Structure






Opening a data entry sheet

1. Open Microsoft Excel or simply open the desired file by double clicking the sheet's icon







Entering Data

• Enter observation checklist data into the program's spread sheet

Maint. ARI	RIVALS	Safety Ol	servation	Er	itry	Sh	ee	t					
Ver 2.3 03-07-00													
	ENTER												COMPILE
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Inappropriate wands used	20												
Proper chocks not used immediately after blocked	1	5		1	. 10	Si.		. 6	9= 3	1		8 3	
PLB warning light & bell not used	8 83	5		2 5	9 88	5/2		107	23 3	8 8		8 5	
Arrival/FOA walkaround not performed	8 99									5 0			
FOA damage not reported/investigated			2	1									
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AMT crossed over A/C towbar	S =6	1		S	1	4		1	34 3	2 3		8. 2	



Recording the number of observations

3. Record the number of observational checklists from which the data is being transferred

Maint. ARF	Safety Observation				
Ver 2.3 03-07-00					
	ENTER				
Number of Sheets to Enter>	1				

- The number of sheets entered is set to "1" by default
- BUT, if you combine more than one checklist together before transferring the data to the database, enter the total number of observation sheets represented by the data in this block
- Press "ENTER" button

(NOTE - if the button does not work, make sure that no cell is still active with a blinking cursor)




Compiling Data

4. Compiling the data produces a graph of the top three safety infractions for each workgroup



- Enter the average number of flights per day
- Press the "COMPILE" button

Note - if the button does not work, make sure that no cell is still active with a blinking cursor



0%

0%

Interline Operations

Construction

If any of root cause boxes contain "DIV/0" it is not an error. It simply means that there is no data for that root cause.



Early Results...

After three months of observational safety audits...

- ✓ Workers & management more focused on safety
- ✓ Safety mentoring producing measurable behavioral changes in workers
- ✓ Error management interventions more easily definable
- ✓ Aircraft & equipment damage reduced
- ✓ Personal injuries reduced
- ✓ Measurable productivity improvements



Safety Metric Program - The Future

Opportunities for improvement:

- ➤ Observation training modules for observers
- ➤ Data-entry training for industry partner teams
- Strategy for adapting to new workplace settings
- Movement toward ACCESS based program
 - More user friendly
 - Multiple source database (accident, near-miss, etc.)
 - Searchable "comments" section
 - Linkable / sortable by "root causes"





Thank You

Aviation Human Factors Research Team

Aviation Technology Department, Purdue University